Record Details
State Tax Credit Auctions
ScholarsArchive at Oregon State University
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Title | State Tax Credit Auctions |
| Names |
Korejwa, Elise
(creator) Eisenhuth, Roland (advisor) |
| Date Issued | 2015-06-09 (iso8601) |
| Note | Graduation date: 2015 |
| Abstract | Tax credit auctions are a new way to fund government programs, dating back to just 2011. In place of funding new programs with direct appropriations from the general fund, tax credit auctions are a means to fund programs by monetizing tax credits. We performed a case study of all of the tax credit auctions that were run in the United States by the end of 2014. We were particularly interested in the motivation behind the choice of this funding mechanism, the efficiency and equity of each of the programs, and what attributes are associated with higher participation rates and a higher price for the tax credits. We found that the incrementalist theory of policy adoption is informative in understanding the invention of this policy mechanism. Marketing and auction design were found to be two factors associated with auction efficiency. The very use of tax credits and interactions between the state and federal tax codes were found to have implications for auction equity because they result in an upside-down subsidy. |
| Genre | Research Paper |
| Topic | Tax Policy |
| Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/1957/56169 |
