Record Details
Field | Value |
---|---|
Title | Fishery Buybacks, Efficiency and Participation |
Names |
Lipton, Douglas
(creator) Holzer, Jorge (creator) DePiper, Geret (creator) |
Date Issued | 2014-07-07 (iso8601) |
Note | presentation |
Abstract | License and vessel buybacks continue to be utilized by fishery managers to achieve reductions in actual and latent fishing effort worldwide. While there is debate about their effectiveness in achieving sustainability, the design of alternative implementing mechanisms has received less attention. When participation is assumed endogenous, the specific features of the mechanism are crucial in shaping incentives, bids and participation. Under costly participation, there is a contrast in how fixed price and reverse auction mechanisms trade off cost effectiveness for participation. We present the rationale for a novel mechanism that buys items offered at the baseline price until either the budget is exhausted or all the items are acquired. With the latter, items are acquired at a premium price until either the budget is exhausted or all the items offered at the high price are bought back. In either case, when the offers exceed the total budget, the winners are determined using a lottery. The mechanism seeks to encourage participation while capping the amount paid per item. The fixed price, reverse auction and two-price scheme with lottery are compared in terms of average cost per item acquired and ex-ante efficiency. We derive the equilibrium strategies for the three mechanisms and use simulations of a model calibrated with data from a buyback of licenses in the Maryland blue crab fishery. If the complexity of the mechanism discourages participation, it is shown that the two-price scheme performs best for most of the distributions of values assumed. |
Genre | Presentation |
Topic | Fisheries Economics |
Identifier | Lipton, Douglas, J. Holzer, and G. DePiperc. 2014. Fishery Buybacks, Efficiency and Participation. In: Towards ecosystem based management of fisheries: what role can economics play?: Proceedings of the Seventeenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, July 7-11, 2014, Brisbane, Australia. Complied by Ann L. Shriver & Melissa Errend. Corvallis, OR: International Institute of Fisheries. |