Record Details
Party Favors: Evidence of Corruption in Party Campaign Spending
ScholarsArchive at Oregon State University
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Title | Party Favors: Evidence of Corruption in Party Campaign Spending |
| Names |
Brainerd, Christopher Allen
(creator) Solberg, Rorie Spill (advisor) |
| Date Issued | 2014-05-13 (iso8601) |
| Note | Graduation date: 2014 |
| Abstract | While discussing what types of campaign finance laws are and are not constitutional in his opinion in McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. ____ (2014), Chief Justice John Roberts stated that “those who govern should be the last people to help decide who should govern.” His intent was to highlight how any regulations that are not narrowly tailored to prevent the act or appearance of quid pro quo corruption, the exchange of an official act for money, do not represent a sufficiently compelling interest to justify infringing on 1st Amendment rights and thus are unconstitutional. But what if those who govern were deciding who should govern, not by enacting campaign finance restrictions on how individuals or PACs spend their funds, but through their own parties’ spending? The prototypical example of corruption is a member of Congress receiving funds and as a result making an official action that benefits the contributor. However, the opposite would also be considered corruption - members of Congress being rewarded after taking some sort of action. I will demonstrate that the way the two parties’ congressional campaign committees spend money is systematically driving who governs by favoring more ideologically extreme candidates. I will further argue that this could represent a compelling interest sufficient to enact further campaign finance restrictions. |
| Genre | Research Paper |
| Topic | Campaign finance |
| Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/1957/48283 |
