Record Details
Water Agencies' Distribution and Inefficiency Under Different Decision Rules
OpenSIUC
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Title | Water Agencies' Distribution and Inefficiency Under Different Decision Rules |
| Creator | Howitt, Richard Zetland, David |
| Description | Water management organizations often distribute water among members according to a political decision function (e.g., voting, historical delivery, etc.) -- not economic functions of willingness to pay or shadow values. As a result, scarce water supplies are lost to some members and found by others, leading to, respectively, over-conservation or over-use of water by the members. We find analytical equilibria with a two-player, game-theoretic model of optimal water distribution under economic... |
| Date | 2006-06-19T07:00:00Z |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Identifier | https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/ucowrconfs_2006/1 https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/context/ucowrconfs_2006/article/1107/viewcontent/31.4._Zetland.pdf |
| Source | 2006 |
| Publisher | OpenSIUC |
